Modelling the Impact of Automatic Fiscal Stabilisers on Output Stabilisation in South Africa by Kibambe Jacques Ngoie & Niek Schoeman
 












Modelling the Impact of Automatic Fiscal Stabilisers 









Working Paper Number 129 
                                                 
1 Lecturer, Department of Economics, University of Pretoria 
2 Professor, Department of Economics, University of Pretoria. Corresponding author: 
Niek.schoeman@up.ac.za  Modelling the impact of automatic ￿scal stabilisers on
output stabilisation in South Africa
Jacques Kibambe￿and Niek Schoemany
May 27, 2009
Abstract
This paper investigates ways in which an e¢ ciency model like ￿ DEA Window analysis￿can
be utilised, under strictly de￿ned conditions, to assess the level of e¢ ciency of automatic ￿scal
stabilisers (AFS). The size of AFS is obtained through gaps in both revenue and expenditures
variables such as tax revenue (current tax on income and wealth), social grants/bene￿ts, and
compensation of employees. The results obtained support evidence of AFS action between 1991
and 2005 and explain distinct cointegrating vectors that exist between the obtained e¢ ciency
scores and some selected variables, such as a corruption perception index (CPI), a conversion
factor (exports), and the level of openness in the economy.
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1 Introduction
For several years, the literature on Public Economics has been characterised by a lively debate
on whether automatic ￿scal stabilisers play a meaningful role in stabilising the business cycle. The
sensitivity of the public sector budget balance to business cycle ￿ uctuations in particular has received
much attention. The role of automatic stabilisers in budget analysis has also become part of the
debate (OECD, 1999). In the 2008 Budget Review, the National Treasury of South Africa also
expressed interest in cyclically adjusted budget analysis.
Automatic ￿scal stabilisers (AFS) consist of economic variables, such as taxes and unemployment
bene￿ts that operate in a direct manner in response to cyclical ￿ uctuations. However, it seems that
the role played by AFS does not receive much attention in less developed countries, probably because
key variables that portray the automatic ￿scal stabilisation e⁄ect, such as unemployment bene￿ts,
are virtually non-existent (or at the very beginning of the implementation stages).
A priori expectations regarding evidence of automatic stabilisation is based on the fact that
government net lending is sensitive to output ￿ uctuations (a Johansen approach) - the ￿rst indication
of the presence of automatic stabilisers within the economy (OECD, 1999). This paper attempts
to measure and assess the e⁄ectiveness of AFS in output gap stabilisation for the South African
economy.
The methodology used to assess the e¢ ciency of AFS variables over the considered time period
(1991 ￿2005) is the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) while a VAR approach is used to evaluate
the counter-cyclical demand impulse stemming from the working of AFS in the economy. Di⁄erent
gaps are computed using an exponential smoothing ￿lter that produces more accurate results than
￿Lecturer, Department of Economics, University of Pretoria
yProfessor, Department of Economics, University of Pretoria. Corresponding author: niek.schoeman@up.ac.za
1the traditional Hodrick Prescott technique. DEA has revealed itself to be one of the most referred
to non-parametric e¢ ciency methods used in the public or non-pro￿t making sectors, the reason
being that it does not require a priori speci￿cation and can be performed on an unlimited number
of outputs and inputs at once. No study on the impact of AFS on output stabilisation using DEA
could be located, although some researchers have been using other e¢ ciency methods such as Free
Disposal Hall (FDH), Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI), and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA).
In this paper, ￿ exible techniques are used to remove outliers from the sample size (Holt Winters
exponential smoothing technique). The SFA method does not allow for the use of a multiple output
approach and the use of the MPI method has not been considered because it does not allow for
the e¢ ciency of a DMU to be calculated individually and instead requires a balanced panel of
quantitative data.
Regional integration requires country di⁄erential information in terms of AFS. As will be dis-
cussed later, similar studies (Fowlie, 1999) have captured the role of AFS through ￿ uctuations of the
business cycle using ￿ progressive taxation￿and ￿ unemployment bene￿ts￿ . Unemployment bene￿ts
as well as social grants are considered to be automatic ￿scal stabilisers since they are intended to
respond to any ￿ uctuation in the business cycle, often without being activated by speci￿c discre-
tionary policies. For example, during a recession, unemployment bene￿ts are expected to rise to
partially compensate for the decrease in household income.
In an African context, donor funding could also be regarded as an AFS. In many instances,
requests for donor funding increase during the downturn phases of the business cycle and decline
during economic upturns. Analysing the e⁄ects of AFS on output stabilisation requires prior un-
derstanding of the functioning of the country￿ s business cycle and the responsiveness of its ￿scal
policies to shocks. The Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) provides some insight into
government expectations regarding the South African business cycle.
A debate has arisen around the real contribution of AFS in assuaging ￿scal policy in￿ exibility
compared to discretionary ￿scal policy (Swanepoel and Schoeman, 2003). Automatic stabilisers
seem to have the advantage of being more ￿ exible and much more responsive to sudden changes
in the business cycle. The European Central Bank has extensively published on the role that AFS
plays in strengthening and enhancing con￿dence during business cycle disturbances. The smoothing
role of AFS can be described through a moderation of the exaggerated rise in some macroeconomic
variables during an economic upturn (boom phase) and the tempering of the decrease of economic
activity during downturns (recession).
The di⁄erent types of AFS that exist can be determined through the domains in which they
a⁄ect the economy. Tax-based AFS entail stabilisation through the tax structures. The principle is
a simple one: tax collection increases during upturns together with a decrease in social grants while
it declines during the downturns with an increase in social grants that stabilises income. The ability
of AFS to smooth the business cycle has been used extensively as an indicator to measure the level
of disturbances that a⁄ect a country￿ s economy (Barrell et al., 2002).
The OECD has developed several analytical frameworks to measure the size and magnitude of
AFS as well as the sensitivity of AFS to shocks across countries (OECD, 1999). The behaviour of
macroeconomic variables, such as imports, consumer spending, ￿nancial markets, exchange rates,
international price competitiveness, variations in labour productivity, etc., have all been included to
explain the impact of AFS to smooth the business cycle (ibid). The frameworks also acknowledge the
temptation to use surplus revenue during upswings although AFS tends to operate more e¢ ciently
during downswings. OECD studies also con￿rm that tax-based stabilisers, such as the current tax
on income and wealth (CTIWH), seem to be more e¢ cient regarding output stabilisation. Partly
based on the e⁄ectiveness of AFS, the European Union developed a stability and growth pact (SGP)
for the better coordination of economic policy with stricter control on governments with regard to
discretionary policies and restrictions imposed on government de￿cits (Barrell et al., 2002). Policies
largely rely on the outputs from the NiGEM model1 for use in for their economic planning.
1NiGEM is a quarterly macroeconomic model used by the National Institute of Economic and Social Research in
2Melitz et al. (1997) states that AFS may not re￿ ect the full picture of ￿scal behaviour over the
business cycle and political, as well as bureaucratic factors could be more important in explaining
￿scal behaviour. Du Plessis and Bosho⁄(2007) refer to the possibility that weak automatic stabilisers
and poor discretionary ￿scal policy may have contributed to pro-cyclical ￿scal policy in South Africa
which actually exacerbated economic ￿ uctuations. However, this paper does not attempt to compare
the use of AFS with discretionary ￿scal policy, neither does it attempt to propagate speci￿c AFS
outcomes through, for example, the introduction of more strict ￿ ￿scal rules￿such as tax/GDP ratios,
etc., that could be used to improve on the role of AFS. As indicated at the beginning, this is merely
an attempt to quantify AFS given the ￿scal policy stance over the period 1991-2005.
2 Methodology and Data
The procedure followed in this paper starts by testing for the presence of automatic ￿scal stabilisers in
South Africa using a structural VAR with testing for cointegration between the output gap (YGAP)
and government net lending (GNL) as a share of GDP. The use of ￿ government net lending￿as the
dependant variable is justi￿able. Government net lending/borrowing, as the balancing tool of the
government, equals the di⁄erence between total revenue and total expenditure. Concomitantly, net
lending/borrowing of the government includes capital expenditure (i.e. gross ￿xed capital formation)
(OECD, 2007). Government revenue mainly constitutes tax revenue, property income, dividends and
social contributions while government expenditures mainly consist of social bene￿ts (unemployment
bene￿ts, social grants, etc), wages and salaries, interest on the public debt, subsidies and gross ￿xed
capital formation. A negative balance implicates a government de￿cit which is sensitive to business
cycle ￿ uctuations and therefore to output (gap) ￿ uctuations. Thus, when there is cointegration
between government net lending/borrowing and output gap ￿ uctuations, it is most likely that the
automatic ￿scal stabilisers are well functioning.
An exponential smoothing ￿lter is then used to compute di⁄erent gaps that capture ￿ uctuations
in explanatory variables such as 1) the gap on current tax on income and wealth (the revenue side
automatic stabilisers); 2) the gap regarding social bene￿ts and grants (expenditure side automatic
stabilisers); and 3) the compensation of employees (explaining the gap at industry level). In order
to obtain e¢ ciency scores, the gaps are run as inputs against the inverse of the GDP gap using
￿ Frontier Analyst￿for a DEA window analysis. Using the scores obtained, structural VAR models
have been constructed to estimate the level of impact that variables, such as a corruption perception
index, a conversion factor (openness) and the level of democracy have on the scores. Thus, we test
to establish the extent to which these variables strengthen the e⁄ects of stabilisers in the economy.
The scores depict how e⁄ective these automatic stabilisers are (both revenue and expenditure) in
reducing output ￿ uctuations, assuming that the deviations in explanatory variables used are mainly
caused by the automatic stabilisation process. In this research, an exponential smoothing ￿lter is
used to reduce these e⁄ects while unemployment bene￿ts have not been included due to the relatively
short time series available. Instead, the series ￿ total socio-economic expenditures￿is used as a proxy
for automatic stabilisation on the expenditure side with real values to remove the in￿ ationary e⁄ects.
The DEA method originates from the Farrell framework (1957) used to measure productive
e¢ ciency. Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) improved the model to include ￿ measure e¢ ciency￿
of a variety of decision-making units (DMU). Charnes et al. (1978) describes DEA as a reliable
methodology for data adjusting with the main purpose to improve public policy analysis. DEA
seems to be the preferred method for e¢ ciency analysis in the non-pro￿t sectors with multiple output
production structures where input and output price data are di¢ cult to obtain. A more technical
description of the DEA method uses sub-vectors and DEA can be described as a methodology that
solves sub-vector equations with output sub-vectors on the one side and input sub-vectors on the
other side. The underlying principle is that a DMU￿ s e¢ ciency is measured in comparison with
the United Kingdom. It uses a New Keynesian framework with forward looking agents (Barrel and Hurst, 2003).
3other DMUs in the industry or sector, assuming that all ￿rms are either on the e¢ ciency frontier
(100%) or below. Thus, DEA window analysis is a useful technique to capture e¢ ciency over time
and to create a time series that can be used in regression analysis providing much larger degrees of
freedom.
Although the fractional problem could be described through a dual formulation, this paper only
considers the primal side of the problem, namely minimising inputs to produce the same level
of outputs. Output is de￿ned as the ￿ inverse output gap￿and inputs consist of the gaps in social
grants, social bene￿ts and current tax on income and wealth. Applying the concepts of DEA window
analysis, the e¢ ciency of decision units over a time period is analysed as it evolves. The weights are
determined upon a restriction. Weights are used to reduce both the multiple inputs and/or multiple
outputs into a unique input or output combination.
The danger of using a DEA with only cross sections is that it does not account for structural
breaks. Once the information considered is recorded including structural breaks, the analysis could
be biased and the results unreliable to policy makers. Thus, this model rather uses variable returns
to scale (Banker, Charness & Cooper, 1984) with the obtained technical e¢ ciency scores linked to
the returns to scale (scale e¢ ciency) of the unit.






















i = 1;:::;m (2)
with: - Oro and Nio: weighted outputs and inputs of the measured DMU;
￿ Ur; Vi ￿ 0, the variable weights;
￿ ho : relative e¢ ciency ratio of DMU.
The e¢ ciency of any of the DMUs is then compared to that of another DMUs￿relative e¢ ciency.
Once the required weights for V ￿
i and U￿
r have been established and one of the above equations
solved, it becomes possible to determine if h￿
o ￿ 1.
If h￿ = 1 then e¢ ciency prevails
In our analysis, the lack of consistent data posed considerable restrictions and we could only
include 14 DMUs. This explains why 6 units have achieved scores of 100 percent. The usefulness
of e¢ ciency scores relies largely on very basic and iterative ratio analysis. The higher the ratio
obtained, the more e¢ cient the related unit is. The e¢ ciency of units is calculated as a function of
the best performing unit (100 percent). Thus, e¢ ciency scores are calculated simply as the ratio of
its distance from the origin compared to the distance from the origin to the frontier envelope.
Both controlled and uncontrolled inputs are used in the analysis. The use of the ￿ inverse output
gap￿rather than the traditional ￿ output gap￿is justi￿ed by the fact that DEA strictly prohibits an
inverse relationship between inputs and the output level. DEA has the advantage of allowing data to
contain zero values provided that there is a minimum of one non-zero input and one non-zero output
per unit. Gaps from the trend have been assumed to capture deviations (positive or negative) and
are considered as absolute values in order to avoid negatives.
4The use of weights is required to control e¢ ciency scores. It forces the programme to consider
all inputs. Weights had to be imposed considering the underlying theory. A minimum weight of 10
percent has been imposed on non tax-based AFS in the model. Tax-based AFS do not carry any
weighting since their e¢ ciency impact could be derived more easily based on economic theory.
Thus, although the software programme used predetermined weights based on an iterative
process, weights imposed from pure theory carry a higher priority. Data was obtained from the
International Financial Statistics data base (IFS) and the South African Reserve Bank (SARB).
Table 1 depicts ￿ uctuations in the South African GDP in comparison to changes in revenue
collected and socio-economic grants paid (as represented by total expenditures due to a lack of
reliable data on grants such as unemployment bene￿ts, etc.).
[Table 1 about here]
Referring to Table 1, a ￿rst approximation shows that automatic stabilisation in South Africa
seems to be mostly expenditure driven; on average, expenditure elasticities are much higher than
revenue elasticities. In fact, with expenditures directly linked to social bene￿t payments one would
a priori expect the latter to be a strong automatic stabiliser.
3 Results
3.1 The output gap and e¢ ciency scores
As explained earlier, use is made of the Johansen technique to mainly test for the number of cointe-
grating vectors while utilising the Holt-Winters smoothing techniques to calculate the output gap.
The AFS e⁄ects are assumed to be non-discretionary based simply on the lack of more appropriate
series, such as unemployment bene￿ts which would have been much more appropriate in terms
of automatic stabilisation. Any deviation from the trend is therefore regarded as an unplanned
response, provided that no major shift in policy is recorded. For each of the selected variables (current
tax on income and wealth (CTIWH), social bene￿ts (SB), and social grants (SG)), smoothed trends
were obtained using the Holt Winter ￿lter. Figures 1 and 2 indicate that as expected, CTIWH, SB,
and SG, present large deviations from the trend each illustrating some form of automatic stabilising
action.
[Figures 1 and 2, about here]
The model used to compute the scores in Table 2 has been set on a BCC mode (varying mode)
seeking to maximise output (the inverse of the output gap) given current inputs. A standard
tolerance is applied as the data set is smaller than 2500. It is a single output multiple inputs
model with one controlled output (inverse Ygap) and three controlled inputs (SGgap, CTIWHgap,
and SBgap). The e¢ ciency scores have been transformed into a time series used as the dependent
variable in the Johansen estimates to test whether any variables, such as corruption, openness, etc.,
have a signi￿cant e⁄ect in strengthening AFS in the South African economy. The threshold of 50
percent is used to distinguish between DMUs in terms of the scores obtained. Scale values are also
included in the table.
[Table 2, about here]
3.2 Cointegrating evidence of e¢ ciency scores
Table 3 shows that at least one (and at most two) cointegrating vectors could be speci￿ed depending
on the trend speci￿cation of the function. Openness indeed enhances the e⁄ect of AFS on output.
The underpinning explanation being that openness contributes to economic growth which in fact
expands the revenue base and results in increased levels of socio-economic expenditure. Table 4
presents the Johansen estimates with signs and magnitudes of the regression ￿ scores￿and ￿ openness￿
with normalisation for one cointegrating equation. Estimates indicate a strong and positive rela-
5tionship between ￿ openness￿and ￿ e¢ ciency scores￿ . It is therefore expected that a larger level of
openness strengthens the in￿ uence of AFS on output ￿ uctuations.
[Table 3 and 4 about here]
In order to observe a possible relationship between e¢ ciency scores and the level of ￿ exibility in
the country￿ s conversion factor (exports), we tested for cointegrating vectors. Finding such cointe-
grating vectors proved to be di¢ cult except in the case of a quadratic trend speci￿cation. Thus, it
should be cautioned that results have to be interpreted with care before relating it to strong policy
considerations (see Table 5).
[Table 5, about here]
Since corruption is often used as an indicator of the level of good governance and a country￿ s
ability to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), it has been incorporated into our analysis. Table
6 presents evidence that supports the presence of cointegration between CPI and e¢ ciency scores.
Data re￿ ecting a corruption perception index were obtained from an unpublished external source
where the countries are classi￿ed on a scale from 1-10. The larger the index, the less corruption
is likely to be found in that country. This index is compiled based on surveys conducted among
business agents (Transparency International, 2007). It should therefore be noted that the index
mostly re￿ ects corruption at corporate levels. Estimates support the view that the less corrupt a
country is, the more active automatic stabilisation will be (see the positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cient
of CPI in the regression in Table 7).
[Tables 6 & 7, about here]
4 Conclusion
A four-step analysis was used to identify the presence and impact of automatic stabilisers in the South
African economy. These steps included 1) measuring the size of AFS using exponential smoothing
￿lters; 2) computing e¢ ciency scores on AFS; 3) identifying key determinants of AFS e¢ ciency
scores in the South African economy using a VAR; and 4) identifying cointegrating relationships
between the scores and these determinants.
A broad conclusion to be derived from this paper is that AFS is active in stabilising output
although their capacity to respond to business cycle ￿ uctuations depends on the level of distortions
existing in the economy and on the duration of shocks.
Higher levels of economic growth and a concomitant increase in socio-economic welfare can only
be possible within a stable economic environment. Accumulating debt limits ￿scal manoeuvrability
in terms of its capacity to react appropriately to macroeconomic ￿ uctuations. Thus, automatic
￿scal stabilisers could make an important contribution towards economic stabilisation in an environ-
ment where governments ￿nd it particularly di¢ cult to correctly time ￿scal interventions to address
volatility in the economy.
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1970  20.63 5.25 0.25448376 10.16 0.516732283
1971  9.35 4.28 0.45775401 7.11 0.601969058
1972  19.43 1.65 0.08492023 -4.69 -0.351812367
1973  16.87 4.57 0.27089508 11.57 0.394987035
1974  31.54 6.11 0.19372226 15.24 0.400918635
1975  19.2 1.7 0.08854167 0.71 2.394366197
1976  14.96 2.25 0.15040107 -2.92 -0.770547945
1977  15.63 -0.09 -0.0057582 -6.34 0.014195584
1978  12.81 3.01 0.23497268 1.99 1.512562814
1979  17.49 3.79 0.21669525 3.08 1.230519481
1980  20.81 6.62 0.31811629 12.85 0.515175097
1981  35.55 5.36 0.15077356 11.46 0.467713787
1982  9.15 -0.38 -0.0415301 -5.71 0.066549912
1983  19.75 -1.85 -0.0936709 -5.61 0.329768271
1984  10.91 5.1 0.46746104 9.07 0.562293275
1985  22.81 -1.21 -0.0530469 -7.76 0.155927835
1986  26.4 0.02 0.00075758 0.74 0.027027027
1987  12.33 2.1 0.1703163 3.78 0.555555556
1988  15.09 4.2 0.27833002 6.26 0.670926518
1989  27.86 2.39 0.08578607 1.19 2.008403361
1990  26.74 -0.32 -0.0119671 -2.05 0.156097561
1991  10.16 -1.02 -0.1003937 -0.62 1.64516129
1992  7.98 -2.14 -0.2681704 -1.87 1.144385027
1993  6.64 1.23 0.18524096 1.6 0.76875
1994  16.9 3.23 0.19112426 5.31 0.608286252
1995  15.38 3.12 0.20286086 4.27 0.730679157
1996  13.7 4.31 0.31459854 4.13 1.043583535
1997  14.86 2.65 0.17833109 2.56 1.03515625
1998  12.28 0.52 0.04234528 -0.14 -3.714285714
1999  11.74 2.36 0.20102215 -0.28 -8.428571429
2000  8.37 4.15 0.4958184 3.31 1.253776435
2001  8.61 2.74 0.31823461 2.37 1.156118143
2002  15.08 3.56 0.23607427 4.76 0.74789916
2003  12.41 2.81 0.2264303 5.26 0.534220532
2004  7.17 3.71 0.51743375 6.29 0.589825119
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Table 2: Efficiency scores over time (years are considered to be the DMUs) 
Note: 
Units 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 
Scores >50 >50 <50 <50 >50 <50 >50 >50 <50 <50 <50 >50 <50 <50
Scale crs crs drs drs crs drs crs crs drs drs drs crs drs irs  drs
1)  Drs: Decreasing returns to scale; 
2)  Irs: Increasing returns to scale; 
3)  Crs: Constant returns to scale. 
 
Table 3: Test for number of cointegrating vectors (Scores and Openness) 
    












Trace  1 1 2  1  2 
Max-Eig  1 1 2  1  2 
Selected (0.05 level*) Number of Cointegrating Relations by Model 
 
 




Prob. (unrestricted Maximum 
Eigenvalue) 
 1.000000   2480.211  0.0000  0.0002 
   (0.00012)  0.0039  0.00039 





9Table 5: Number of cointegrating vectors (Scores and Conversion Factor) 
  
Data Trend:  None  None  Linear  Linear  Quadratic
Test Type 
No 
Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept 
  No Trend  No Trend  No Trend  Trend  Trend 
Trace 0 0 0 0 2 
Max-Eig  0 0 0 0 2 
 
 
Table 6: Number of cointegrating vectors (Scores and CPI) 
 
Data 
Trend: None None  Linear  Linear  Quadratic 
Test Type  No Intercept  Intercept  Intercept  Intercept  Intercept 
  No Trend  No Trend  No Trend  Trend  Trend 
Trace  2 1 2 0  0 
Max-Eig  2 1 2 0  0 
 
 





Prob. (unrestricted Maximum 
Eigenvalue) 
 1.000000   14.52117  0.0219  0.1037 
   (0.00442)  0.0723  0.0723 




10     Figure 1:  SB vs SBSM                                     
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